I had recently come across an article on how morality depends on atheism. It's an interesting take I haven't heard before. It comes from a 2013 paper by Stephen Maitzen. The following is an exploration of that paper.

Maitzen opens acknowledging that a large number of people believe God (God and theism here refer to the one from Abrahamic origins) is essential for morality; those that do not believe do not have the "prerequisites" to make sound moral judgements (potentially due to the "subjective" nature of atheistic moral frameworks - not always the case), and therefore do not behave ethically. This view is mainly held within societies moulded by histories of traditional theistic beliefs. To the theist, divine authority is a necessity for objective morals, it's something to fall back on. It’s what lets them know what is good, and what isn't. If this is stripped away, to the theist, there is no way to know what is right or wrong. It leaves society in a state of moral anarchism. Maitzen presents some statistics from the American Sociological Review showing that Americans distrust atheists more than any other group: 39.6% believe that atheists do not share their vision for what an American society should look like, 47.6% say they would not let their daughter marry an atheist, and acceptance towards atheists have not shown any growths over the last four decades. Despite this, though, Maitzen believes that our most basic moral duties exist only if God doesn't.

The paper he presents isn't empirical in nature. That is, his argument doesn't revolve around presenting statistics and deducing conclusions from them. Rather it is conceptual; the paper focuses on how the tri-omni deity of the Abrahamic religion (one that is all good, all loving, and all knowing) is incompatible with fundamental moral duties. He argues, for example, that it doesn't make sense to relieve the suffering of a child if a perfect being believes that this suffering is for some greater good.

Maitzens argument

Maitzen begins by examining the moral implications of a tri-omni deity. Some theists assert that God is all-knowing and all loving. With this being the case, God would know how to prevent immense, pointless suffering, and also that he would also not act in any way that is immoral. However, Maitzen points out that we not only see, but hear about the unjust suffering of children all the time, with no merit to their suffering. No (at least obvious) benefit to it. It being "unjust" is important here. How would a morally perfect being allow for such suffering if it wasn’t for the ultimate benefit of that child? If it is for no other reason than for the benefit of the child (which would make it just), then what are our moral obligations towards this child? This is to say that for example, allowing the child to suffer for some benefit of someone else, like to test someone else or to allow an abuser to exercise their free will, is immoral. In the case where a child may have a deadly disease, we would limit their freedoms (quarantine them) for the benefit of others. We perform triage to patients to allow others to be attended to based on priority, but this cannot be applicable to a tri-omni deity. It is a testament to our imperfection as human beings; we lack absolute knowledge and are limited by it as well as our power, which makes us have to resort to prioritising others over some. A perfect deity is not subject to this limitation (or any). 

Maitzen continues by pointing out that, there are many undeserved forms of suffering that children experience every day. Every week we hear the stories of children in Gaza being killed, some not even reaching a year on this earth. We, as human beings, even if we are not able to, feel a moral obligation to help these children. However, if God is morally perfect, any suffering is necessary or, as Maitzen puts it, "optimal" for the sufferer. Optimal in the sense that it is the best course of action to achieve the best outcome (greater good). If this is the case, then our moral obligations above would be undermined. We do not stop doctors from providing vaccinations due to the small amount of suffering that makes children (and adults like you reading this) cry, because it is necessary for their betterment (it boosts their immunity). But even anti-vaxxers, as interesting as they are, withdraw their children from this treatment, because whatever cost benefit analysis they have done has convinced them that allowing the child to take the vaccine would not benefit the child, or anyone, long term. Divine perfection, along with God’s all-knowing nature would suggest that allowing suffering indicates that there is some divine purpose, and if preventing this suffering is unnecessary for this purpose, then why prevent it?

He finishes off this section introduction the idea of "reverse triage". If God permits suffering when necessary, then when suffering is extreme, there must be a significantly large benefit to the suffering, such that the more suffering an individual endures would mean we actually deprioritise this type of suffering. We can’t just say that the individual was compensated in the end, though, because compensation does not equal justification. If someone harmed you some way, in a court of law you will be compensated, but this compensation does not justify the initial action. In the book of Job, after God allows "Satan" to torment Job, killing all his children and destroying his house, God compensates him with more children. But this does not justify the initial act. A potential objection to this is explored later, but for the meantime think of this question: if you were given this test that God assigned to Job, would you see the initial act as justified if, after passing, you were compensated with more children? These are not just 4-month-old babies, I am talking children that can speak, go to school, cognise their world.

Counter Arguments

Can God exploit?

Weird question, but stay with me. Maitzen begins to get into some counter-arguments. The first is one raised by Richard Swinburne. It goes like this: God is able to allow the suffering of a child to benefit others, because that child owes its existence to God. He has complete authority over the child's life, and so can do what he would like. He has the right to do as he pleases, especially if for some higher purpose. Maitzen shows us why this doesn’t work. He uses the idea of cloning a child, raising it well for most of its life, apart from the end, where he allows the child to be brutally tortured in front of onlookers. This is done to teach them about how horrible child abuse is, as some form of aversion therapy. It may be successful to some, but Maitzen argues that being the benefactor of the child’s existence does not make the action justifiable, even for the benefit of others. Would I never protect my child in situations where they may suffer tremendously had I not stepped in, because of some greater good? No, especially considering the gravity of this suffering.

Maizen argues that, if God was to "exploit" this child for some greater good, that there must be a net benefit. But some net benefit isn't acceptable. He draws an example to illustrate this. Let us say that God allows Jack to endure undeserved and severe suffering so Jill (his love interest) sends him a get well soon card. Jack doesn't benefit in a way proportional to the suffering. The suffering endured must be justified by some net benefit so significant that it offsets the suffering of the individual. A child suffering from terminal cancer only for a charity to receive some extra donations for a period of time than it used to, does not justify him being bestowed terminal cancer. This is still a form of compensation, rather than justification.

Not truth... Belief

Maitzen had already argued that theistic doctrines undermine our moral obligations to prevent undeserved suffering, or really any suffering; it implies that all suffering benefits the sufferer or others in some way. But ordinary (common sense) morality conflicts with this as most will believe that much suffering isn’t for the benefit of the individual, like the case of the little boy that was tortured for wetting his pants. What could possibly be the greater good here? For those reading to feel remorse or anger for a small while? Or what about the innocent children in Gaza dying, with no benefit to those children or anyone else? The assumption of ordinary morality is that not all suffering is necessary or essential. If we accept the premise of theism: that God would not allow suffering unless there is some purpose or greater good/benefit, then we must question whether we have any moral obligation to prevent suffering. It also raises another question: if there are instances where we should intervene, where there are large amounts of suffering, how are we supposed to know that this suffering is the suffering not a part of the greater good, or towards some benefit?

But what about free will?

An incredibly common defence of suffering is that of free will. Theists may argue that God allows human beings to commit atrocities not because God is evil, but because the basic, intrinsic right a human has - free will - would be violated, and therefore, it implies that respecting the autonomy of any human being (including the one infringing on the autonomy of the child for seemingly no benefit) justifies no divine intervention. The author not only says that this justification conflicts with our ordinary idea of morality, but puts it bluntly that this is a "moral monstrosity". If someone had the power to stop the torture of a child, but did nothing in order to respect the autonomy of that individual, the act would be considered morally reprehensible. Why is it, then, that this does not apply to an all-loving deity? When innocent children and people are involved, why is it that our intuition guides us to prevent such harm, but God, the perfect being he is, is morally exempt from stepping in?

Theodicy’s relating to heaven

Another common rebuttal is to respond that heaven is a place of bliss and eternal joy/happiness, and that any suffering, no matter how immense, will be compensated for. But this, the author argues, conflates compensation with justification. Compensating someone later does not mean the initial act itself is justified as explored earlier. The fact that wrongs are forgiven doesn’t mean the person that committed the heinous act was justified at all. Even if the abused forgives the abuser, and is compensated, the act itself is not justified. It conflicts with our intuition of preventing harmL if heaven is the ultimate compensations and (supposed) justification, why prevent suffering? When it comes to morality, responsibility is determined at the moment of the act taking place. Eternal reward doesn’t erase the necessity to prevent suffering, at least from a common-sense point of view.

Divine command theory. How does it fare?

Maitzen acknowledges the reply that we have a moral obligation to prevent suffering on some occasions because God has commanded us to. Aside from the ambiguous nature of divine commands, he acknowledges three ways this fails. Firstly, it requires what Jeff Jordan calls a "recalibration of morality". Basically, if we assume that moral obligations come from God’s commands, then we have recalibrated morality such that it no longer is determined by compassion, empathy, etc., but is now determined by "God says so". But this strips away moral value; we no longer look to alleviate suffering because we care for the individual. We just do it because someone told us to. Second, and for me I think the most damaging argument, is of the useless nature of the command in the first place. If suffering is for the greater good of the individual, why would it be commanded that we human beings interfere? If the individual suffering suffers for some greater good, such that preventing suffering doesn't actually maximise happiness or well-being, then to follow such a command would be counterproductive and useless. Why issue such a command in the first place? Is he alright? Finally, and a bit more obvious, is that there is nowhere in scripture where we are commanded to relieve absolutely everyone of their suffering. We are not told about specific cases, how to act in one case and the other, there is nothing but post hoc reconciliation of scripture to support whatever narrative the reconciler would like to achieve.

All in all, I found this paper convincing. I think it does touch on some very important moral implications and addresses (successfully) many potential rebuttals. This argument definitely is one that stands firm on the argument from evidentiary evil, and builds a unique and interesting conceptual argument.